1: Melamid K-4 (no date) 1953 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4
Qatar MK3

and their subjects, assisted by the occasional vigilance of British cruisers and sloops, piracy ceased, and since the 1840's the coast (except for Qatar) has been known as the "Trucial Coast," and the sheikhdoms collectively as "Trucial 'Oman," though there exists no political connection between the sheikhdoms of the coast and the sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman to the east.

Slave trading in natives of the coast, other Arabs, and Africans, and also gunrunning, long a subsidiary occupation, became predominant after the establishment of the maritime truce. Before the end of the nineteenth century Great Britain was forced to make another series of treaties with the sheikhs outlawing these practices.[5] In return for small subsidies, the sheikhs were prohibited from granting concessions for mining operations or bunkering stations to nationals of other states except with the approval of the British government. Further, British officials stationed in the area of the Persian Gulf obtained the right to supervise any foreign nationals entering or residing in the area of the sheikhs. These clauses were supposed to guarantee Great Britain against the threatened acquisition of bases by France, Russia, and Germany, which would have disturbed British naval dominance in the Indian Ocean. By means of these treaties the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf became virtual British protectorates in all matters of international concern, but without British military occupation or civilian administration. The British Indian rupee gradually became the currency in use along the coast; in the interior the Maria Theresa dollar is more acceptable.

In accordance with the policy of nonintervention in internal affairs, Great Britain recognizes no boundaries between the sheikhdoms. Trucial sheikhs are therefore able to attack and absorb one another's territory without restriction, and, similarly, new Trucial sheikhdoms can emerge if they agree to the provisions of the treaties. For example, the 1820 agreement was signed by eight local sheikhs (exclusive of the sheikh of Bahrein, signing for Qatar), but only six were left to sign the 1835 treaty. In 1914, only five sheikhdoms were reported to exist,[6] and today the number seems to be seven Trucial sheikhdoms and one sheikhdom, Fujaira, outside the Trucial treaties (Table I). The fate of the vanished sheikhdoms is unknown. As Sir Percy Cox[7]

[5] It should be noted that these treaties refer only to the external relations of the region. Therefore slavery of natives is exclusively subject to local law and custom and is independent of the treaty relation with Great Britain. Several recent reports mention the existence of slavery in the region but without citing definite cases. Nothing is known of the extent of the slavery, its conditions, or its economic importance.

[6] For example, in Peace Handbooks, Vol. 13, Foreign Office, Historical Section, London, 1920, p. 43.

[7] Some Excursions in Oman, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 66, 1925, pp. 193–237; reference on p. 200.

1: Melamid K-4 (no date) 1953 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4 QATAR MK3

TABLE I—STATES OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PERSIAN GULF REGION
(The population is the estimated settled population.)

STATE	POLITICAL STATUS	CAPITAL AND POPULATION	BEFORTED BOUNDARIES	REMARKS
QATAR*	Trucial sheikhdom until 1868; British confirmation of independent British-protected status in 1913 and 1916.	Doha	East-west across the peninsula from Khor al Odeid; area given as 4,500 square miles.	Resident British representative since 1930; no statistical information available except data on crude-oil exports; dispute with Bahrein on rights in the northwest end of peninsula.
ABU DHABI	Trucial sheikhdom since 1820.	Abu Dhabi, 4000 to 10,000	On the coast west at Khor el Odeid, east at Khor al Ghamadha; one day's camel journey inland; area given as 2500 square miles.	In area probably the largest of the present Trucial states; the town of Abu Dhabi is connected to the mainland by a causeway covered with water at high tide, and has a poor supply of drinking water; good relations with the Bedouins of the region are reported.
DIBAI	Trucial sheikhdom since 1820.	Dibai, 20,000	On the coast west at Khor al Ghamadha, east at Abu Hail; area given as 1500 square miles.	The town of Dibai is probably the largest of the region, containing the local market for pearls and the office of the local representative of the petroleum concessionaire; airplane base; the town is located on the most navigable creek of the area and is occasional port of call for steamers from overseas; recent visitors report friction between the sheikh and local Bedouins and with the descendants of the former ruling family (until last century) resident at Dairah, across the creek from Dibai.
SHARJAH	Trucial sheikhdom since 1820.	Sharjah, 3000 to 15,000	Encloses sheikhdom of Ajman; stretches inland to Dhaid.	Aerodrome with fortified compound for passengers' accommodation; offshore pearling grounds; residence of British representative for the Trucial Coast; formerly overlord of Ras al Khaima and other sheikhdoms, and thus most important political power in the region; the town of Sharjah is visited by steamers from India.
AJMAN	Trucial sheikhdom since 1820.	Ajman 2000	Sometimes reported entirely enclosed by territory of Sharjah; also reported as bordering territory of Ras al Khaima; area given as 150 square miles.	Sometimes reported to be tributary to Sharjah; sheikh keeps a riding stable.
UMM AL QAIWAIN	Trucial sheikhdom since 1820.	Umm al Qaiwain, 2000	Including the oasis Falaj al Ali; area given as 250 square miles.	In the past more important than today; frequently at war during the nineteenth century; occupies before 1883 part of Sharjah, and again from 1906 to 1909; the town of Umm al Qaiwain is located on a small peninsula.
RAS AL KHAIMA	Trucial sheikhdom since 1919.	Ras al Khaima, 3000	On the coast west at Jazirat al Hamra, east at Sha'am; reported to extend inland but exclude the mountainous area.	In the past tributary to Sharjah; in 1952 the sheikh refused to give permission for the establishment of a flying-boat base; in contrast with other sheikhdoms, a large part of the revenue is derived from the sale of dates.

1: Melamid K-4 (no date) 1963 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

TABLE 1—*Continued*

STATE	POLITICAL STATUS	CAPITAL AND POPULATION	REPORTED BOUNDARIES	REMARKS
631 162 361 131 438 RALBA	Trucial sheikhdom since 1937.	Kalba, 5000 to 5000	On the coast of the Gulf of 'Oman north at Dibba, south at Khor Kalba; includes territory on the west side of the mountains of 'Oman.	In the past tributary to Sharjah.
'OMAN	Independent British-protected sultanate.	Muscat, 500,000	Enclave on the peninsula of Musandam west at Sha'am, east at Dibba; main territory on Gulf of 'Oman east of Khor Kalba.	'Oman sovereignty over peninsula of Musandam established with British help.
OTHER TERRITORIES:				
FUJARAH	Sheikhdom without Trucial status.	....	Probably enclave in Kalba located primarily near the Gulf of 'Oman.	In the past probably tributary to Sharjah.
BURAIMI	Neutral area claimed by Saudi Arabia, 'Oman, and Abu Dhabi.	5000	Probably bounded by many Trucial sheikhdoms and 'Oman.	Inland oasis reported before 1925 and today under the influence of Abu Dhabi.
HAFIT	Reported joint property of Abu Dhabi and 'Oman.	....	....	Near Buraimi.
DHAID	Reported as neutral part of Sharjah, and part of Kalba.	....	....	On shorter road from the Persian Gulf to Gulf of 'Oman.
LIWA	Political control nowhere described.	....	....	Southwest of Abu Dhabi; reported to be trading with Abu Dhabi.

[a]Parts of the region between the boundaries of Qatar and the town of Abu Dhabi may be territory of Saudi Arabia. South of the town of Abu Dhabi there may be territory of the Trucial sheikhdoms or of Saudi Arabia or of 'Oman or of Aden Protectorate.

As Sir Percy Cox[1]!

631 622 ● 648 628 writes: "The relative position of the Principalities . . . depends almost entirely on the personalities of the ruling Shaikhs for the time being. Unfortunately, owing to the chronic prevalence . . . of . . . feuds, they have for the last few generations been a short-lived class." Besides the territories of the sheikhs, there are neutral areas. In one of them, the Buraimi Oasis, near the border of 'Oman, a durbar (an official meeting of all the Trucial sheikhs with a British representative) took place in 1945;[8] this inconveniently located place was selected because sheikhs' wars prevented the choice of a better place near the coast. Another neutral area (although there seems to be a difference of opinion 631 on its status) is the oasis of Dhaid,[9] on the motorcar route from Sharjah to the

[8] O'Shea, *op. cit.* [see footnote 3, above], p. 171. See below (p. 204) for other claims to Buraimi.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 156. See also Desmond Vesey-Fitzgerald: From Hasa to Oman by Car, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 42, 1952, pp. 544-560; reference on p. 553.

[1][For footnote, see p. 197 of text -- Analyst]

Gulf of 'Oman established by the Middle East Anti-Locust Unit in 1943. Besides Trucial sheikhs and their immediate subjects, there are Bedouins, who, however, do not engage in any activity on the seas and are thus outside the provisions of the treaties. In general, the Bedouins recognize the authority of one or another of the Trucial sheikhs, but changes of allegiance are numerous. Bedouins may decide to make wars of their own, or to change sides during wars between Trucial sheikhs, which makes the political position even more complex. In recent years Bedouins have frequently attacked the motor convoys of British nationals traveling in the definite territory of peaceful sheikhs,[10] but under the provisions of the treaties there seems to be no legal remedy to stop this armed aggression, except through successful local wars by the sheikhs.

As a result of the nature of the treaties, the culture of the area, containing both Arab and Iranian elements, has been preserved practically free of any foreign admixture. Dr. A. R. Lindt,[11] a Swiss observer writing in 1939, was particularly impressed by this achievement. Slowly, however, twentieth-century influences have begun to appear. In the early 1930's Great Britain, in the course of a quarrel over oil concessions in Iran, relocated its air routes to India over Trucial 'Oman instead of Iran. Rights to land seaplanes at Dibai and landplanes at Sharjah were acquired, and maintenance crews and other personnel were permanently stationed there. To ensure safety during local wars, overnight quarters for passengers, with permanent armed guards, were established in a fortified compound near Sharjah. Landing fees, levied according to the number of passengers, were payable to the sheikhs in whose territory landings took place. These landing fees constituted a large part of the revenues of the sheikh of Sharjah, whose only other income is derived from a tax on pearling, which is hard to collect.[12] During the war, rights to make emergency landings on the island of Yas were also acquired by the British government. Today, larger planes can fly directly from Bahrein to Karachi, and little use is made of the landing rights on the Trucial Coast, so that the sheikhs' revenues must have decreased substantially. The introduction of the motorcar has also had a marked effect on the local economy. Traffic from inland oases and the Gulf of 'Oman to the cities on the shores of the Persian Gulf is important, though no statistical data are available.

The presence of oil had been suspected since the beginning of the century, but the inaccessibility of the region together with its uncertain political status

[10] O'Shea, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[11] Politics in the Persian Gulf, *Journ. Royal Central Asian Soc.*, Vol. 26, 1939, pp. 619–633.
[12] O'Shea, *op. cit.*, pp. 76 and 140.

TABLE II—CONCESSIONS FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES IN THE SOUTHEASTERN PERSIAN GULF REGION

STATE	CONCESSIONAIRE	DATE	TERM	DEVELOPMENT	REMARKS
QATAR	1. For territory of state: Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd., subsidiary of Iraq Petroleum Co.	1935	75 years	Production since 1949; reached in March, 1952, 68,000 barrels a day (March, 1951, 46,500; March, 1950, 34,000; March, 1949, nil).	By arbitration, the concession is to include resources under the sea within the three-mile limit.
	2. For subsurface offshore rights beyond the three-mile limit: Superior Oil Co. of San Francisco, Calif., jointly with Central Mining and Investment Corporation of London, England; concession abandoned and transferred to the Royal Dutch Shell Co., 1952.	1949	Not available		Ditto outside three-mile limit.
ABU DHABI	1. For territory of sheikhdom: Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd., subsidiary of Iraq Petroleum Co. 2. For subsurface offshore rights: Superior Oil Co. of San Francisco, Calif.; concession abandoned, 1952.	1939	75 years	Exploration begun in 1950.	Arbitration award as above, 1.
		1949	Not available		Arbitration award as above, 2.
OTHER TRUCIAL STATES	Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.	No details available			
'OMAN	Petroleum Development ('Oman and Dhofar) Ltd., subsidiary of Iraq Petroleum Co.	No details available			
SAUDI ARABIA (part adjoining Trucial 'Oman)	Arabian American Oil Co.	1933	66 years	Exploration begun.	
ADEN PROTECTORATE	Petroleum Concessions Ltd., subsidiary of Iraq Petroleum Co.	No details available			

T seems to have discouraged plans for development. However, in 1935 the sheikh of Qatar signed a concession agreement, and in 1939 the sheikhs of the Trucial Coast followed (Table II). All the concessions were assigned to subsidiaries of the Iraq Petroleum Company in which British, American, Dutch, French, and private interests participate. Until now commercial production of oil has taken place only in Qatar; development in Trucial 'Oman is still in the early exploratory stage. The oil at Qatar is obtained at about 6000 feet from a Jurassic limestone rock reservoir in a long, narrow anticline. It is believed that either these strata or the thick, highly productive Cretaceous sandstone series of Kuwait extend to Trucial 'Oman.

1: Melamid K-4 (no date) 1953 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4
Qatar MK3

even Aden Protectorate. Present boundaries with these states are vague. Vesey-Fitzgerald,[17] for example, reports that "it seems generally agreed that the [salt pan] Sabkha Mutti forms the boundary" between Saudi Arabia and Trucial 'Oman. Other authorities, including the British Foreign Office Peace Handbook,[18] locate the boundary of Trucial 'Oman at Khor el Odeid, at the base of the peninsula of Qatar, and thus exclude Saudi Arabia from the Persian Gulf east of Qatar. The World Aeronautical Chart[19] shows undemarcated territory of Trucial 'Oman between the 51st and 52nd meridians. Boundaries farther inland are subject to even wider disagreement. Some recent American maps[20] show the whole of the northern Rub' al Khali as part of Saudi Arabia and restrict Trucial 'Oman roughly to the area northeast of the town of Abu Dhabi. A map in the Middle East reference book[21] shows territory of Aden Protectorate to the south of the Liwa Oasis where other maps locate Saudi Arabian territory. Vesey-Fitzgerald[22] reports that the country east of the Sabkha Mutti salt swamp "for the distance of 'one camel journey' inland is Trucial territory. What happens beyond the one day's journey nobody knows." The Sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,[23] and the Trucial sheikhs, including the sheikh of Abu Dhabi, claim the Buraimi Oasis; the oasis of Hafit is described as jointly owned by the sultan of 'Oman and the sheikh of Abu Dhabi.[24] Coastal points of the eastern boundary of Trucial 'Oman agreed on are Khor Kalba and Dibba on the Gulf of 'Oman and Sha'am on the Persian Gulf; this creates an exclave of 'Oman in the peninsula of Masandam.[25] Iran has also put forward claims to both Qatar and the Trucial Coast, based on tributes paid by sheikhs of the area to Iran centuries ago, and also on the presence of a small Iranian minority

[17] *Op. cit.* [see footnote 9, above], p. 549.

[18] *Loc. cit.* [see footnote 6, above].

[19] Sheet 547, Bahrayn Island, 1:1,000,000, 3rd edit., Aeronautical Chart Service, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1950.

[20] For example, as shown by J. T. Duce of the Arabian American Oil Company in "The Near East Today," a paper read before the American Petroleum Institute, November 7, 1951.

[21] "The Middle East," 2nd edit., Europa Publications, London, 1950, p. 7.

[22] *Op. cit.* [see footnote 9, above], p. 549.

[23] Wilfred Thesiger: Desert Borderlands of Oman. *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 116, 1950, pp. 137–171; reference on p. 140. The *New York Times* printed the following in its issue of October 12, 1952: "The Saudi Arabian Government denied through its embassy in Washington last night that any of its armed forces were in the Buraimi region near the Persian Gulf. The British Foreign Office was reported to have said Thursday that forty armed Saudi-Arabians had occupied an oasis claimed by the Sultanate of Masqat (Muscat). In its statement King Ibn Saud's embassy charged that the British had sent troops and planes to the area."

[24] O'Shea, *op. cit.* [see footnote 3, above], p. 177.

[25] Bertram Thomas: The Musandam Peninsula and Its People the Shihuh, *Journ. Central Asian Soc.*, Vol. 16, 1929, pp. 71–86.

1: Melamid K-4 (no date) 1953 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4
Qatar MK3

in the towns along the coast. A further basis of the Iranian claim is the high proportion of the trade of the region that appears to flow to and from Iran, and is in the hands of Iranian traders, many of whom have migrated to the coast in the last 25 years. In 1951 discussions were reported to have begun between Great Britain and Saudi Arabia regarding the boundaries between the various British protectorates and Saudi Arabia, but at the time of this writing (late 1952) no conclusions have been announced.

Despite these political uncertainties and the resulting absence of civil authority, test wells are being drilled in Trucial 'Oman. Two in the sheikhdom of Dibai (at Jebel Ali and Ras Sedr) have been abandoned at a depth of 12,000 feet. A third well, in the sheikhdom of Abu Dhabi, is now planned, 12 miles inland from Tarif. Because of the shallow waters off Tarif, drilling equipment and other supplies will have to be discharged at Zubaya, 65 miles distant. As in Qatar, considerable local construction will be necessary before any commercial production of oil can be undertaken.

Since President Truman's claim in 1945 to United States jurisdiction over the resources located underneath the shallow seas of the continental shelf off the United States, no fewer than eleven states in the Persian Gulf area have asserted similar, if not more sweeping, rights, in spite of the absence of many boundaries on land.[86] Probably most of these claims contradict one another. So far, oil has been struck at only one point offshore in the Persian Gulf, in the extreme northwest part, effectively claimed by Saudi Arabia. However, even before this discovery the sheikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, independently of each other, had granted concessions to their proclaimed offshore resources to another company, which is not a partner in the Saudi Arabian oil concession or in the Iraq Petroleum Company. In both cases the subsidiaries of this company holding the oil concessions from Qatar and from the sheikhdoms of Trucial 'Oman complained that these offshore concessions infringed on their rights, which they maintained included all resources under the jurisdiction of the sheikhs. Both disputes were arbitrated under the terms of the concession agreements. In 1950 the arbitrator in the case of Qatar, Lord Radcliffe, distinguished between the territory of Qatar, which includes the sea and subsurface resources up to the three-mile limit, and other rights of Qatar in the open sea beyond the three-mile limit. Throughout the territory of Qatar as defined by the arbitrator the concession of the Iraq Petroleum Company's subsidiary is valid; elsewhere, wherever

[86] S. W. Boggs: National Claims in Adjacent Seas, *Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 41, 1951, pp. 185–200, summarizes the complicated situation before arbitration.

Brideaux, in the last century. Formerly this part of the coast was known in English official literature as 'The Pirate Coast', on account of the prevalence of piracy in these waters, although the Arabs call it *Sahil 'Oman* (Oman Coast) or *Shamal*, after the hot north wind which blows across the Gulf.

In 1853, a Treaty or 'Truce' was signed between the British Government and the five principalities—Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Umm-al-Quwain and Sharjah. This 'perpetual truce' provided for the entire cessation of liabilities at sea amongst the signatories and imposed on the British Government the duty of enforcing peace, and obtaining reparation for maritime aggression committed in contravention of the agreement. The sheikhs are, therefore, styled 'Trucial Sheikhs'.

A second treaty was signed in 1892, by which the sheikhs bound themselves not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any power other than the British Government; not to permit without the sanction of the British Government the residence within their territory of the agent of any other government, and not to sell, cede, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation, any part of their territories, save to the British Government.

By these two treaties preferential, and almost exclusive relations were created between the British Government and the Trucial chiefs, and the former appears to assume the moral obligation to protect the sheikhs in so far as they may be endangered or disabled from defending themselves. It should be noted that, under the treaty of 1853, the trucial obligations of the sheikhs only extend to their maritime activities and not to the interior of their domains.

There is some disagreement amongst geographers as to the definition of the term 'Oman', which in some maps is made to cover the whole of the promontory as far east as Muscat. In practice, the Trucial Oman coast is that territory which lies to the west and south of the Western Hajar mountains, including the Shamailiyah range, and extends almost to Qatar and the Ar Rimal section of the Rub-al-Khali desert. East of the Hajar mountains, on the Gulf of Oman, the country is known as Oman, and is under the rule of the Sultan of Muscat, although sometimes the term Oman is applied to the whole of this promontory.

Upon the coast, Trucial Oman extends in the Gulf of Oman from Khor Kalba to Dubai, and in the Persian Gulf from Sha'am to Khor-al-Odaid. Inland its frontiers are more difficult to define, but they cover a considerable portion of the interior of the Oman

companies; this is quite distinct from the actual royalties received from oil-producing wells, which, in several cases, have made millionaires of the sheikhs. In the Trucial Oman Coast, the independent sheikhs are not only paid landing fees for each aircraft, but receive a substantial rental for the use of their lands as aerodromes and flying-boat alighting sites, including emergency landing places which are seldom, if ever, used. There is, in addition, a large amount of native labour employed by the British Government in the vicinity of camps and airfields, which gives an additional source of income to the sheikhs.

It is to be regretted that out of his large income the average sheikh contributes very little indeed to the welfare and enlightenment of his people. There are no schools to speak of, except in the larger sheikhdoms, such as Bahrein; roads are an unheard-of luxury; there is no system of sanitation, drainage, or water supply; graft and chicanery amongst the sheikh's ministers are rife, so that large profits are made by the ruling families and merchants out of the silver rupee exchange and, by a cunning system of cornering the markets in wheat and other essential produce, the people are frequently kept short of food or obliged to buy at exhorbitant prices. In other words, it suits the convenience and the pockets of the sheikhs to retain an ignorant and illiterate peasantry, living in conditions of extreme poverty and intolerable squalor.

Unfortunately the British Government, through its system of treaty-relations with the sheikhs, unwittingly fosters this undemocratic form of rule. Under the treaties, which give the British Government certain territorial and coastal rights and privileges, and protect the Arab chieftains against attack from a foreign power (though not, it is to be noted, against tribal wars), the rulers are encouraged to maintain a traditional form of government, and are advised by a British Resident, usually an Arab civil servant, and a Political Officer. The latter, who is appointed by the Indian Government, is usually an ex-officer of an Indian regiment. His principal duty is to ensure that the conditions of the treaties are observed, and to advise the sheikh on matters of state, so that friction does not arise between the throne and its subjects.

Politically and strategically, the Trucial coast is of extreme importance to the British Empire, and in maintaining a benevolent suzerainty over this territory we must, at the same time, keep within the bounds of international law. Thus, while we exercise no colonial or territorial rights over Oman, which is, legally speaking,

● 648 not a dependency, and over which we hold no mandate, British interests are such that any display of truculence on the part of the rulers would be put down very peremptorily. On the other hand, the existence of an Arab League and the effectively close unity among Moslem peoples throughout the world, must incline British authority to tread warily. Any form of pressure which could be construed by Cairo propagandists as persecution, might easily lead to disturbances in the Arab world beyond Arabia, with unforeseen results.

648 The problem is a difficult one. Any reforms of communal life,
511 such as the provision of schools, courts of law based on Western procedure, good roads, efficient water supply and sanitation, the provision of hospitals and pre-natal centres, municipal medical services, and a proper supervision over food supplies and control of prices, all of which are long-standing necessities, should be undertaken by the paramount rulers, the sheikhs, but they, for obvious reasons, are not anxious to diminish their personal incomes by such 'extravagances'.

The British Government, whose treaty 'rights' in Arabia are in reality confined to safeguarding the coasts from foreign aggression, and preventing acts of piracy, has only the rights of a tenant in the inland regions. It is true that active slavery is contrary to the agreement reached between the sheikhs and the British Government, and that for the perpetration of this or certain other 'international' crimes the British Government could exert pressure on the sheikhs, but it is doubtful whether, in these times of political freedom, we could persuade them to rebuild their towns and undertake similar expensive measures to create a healthy social order. On the other hand, the British Government benefits considerably from its commercial and military interests in the Trucial Oman Coast, and has a certain moral responsibility for the peoples inhabiting its zones of influence.

It would thus be quite possible to grant a British loan to the sheikhs for the express purpose of building up such essential public works as hospitals, schools, roads and efficient sanitation schemes, and to set up an organization to ensure that these schemes were properly
[186] carried out. The majority of the rulers would have no objection to foreign money being utilized for the improvement of their townships, provided the suspicion could be overcome that foreign influence and interference in internal affairs would not thereby be increased, and their own power and authority diminished. Any

supervision of such schemes should preferably be undertaken by an adviser who was familiar with Arab mentality and possessed of a diplomatic 'flair', and the most suitable recruits could be found in the ranks of those imperturbable and tactful officials, the Political Officers.

Arabia, and the Oman Coast in particular, are of immense value to the British Commonwealth, for, apart from their importance to the R.A.F. and the Royal Navy, as strategic bases guarding the land and sea routes to India, the Far East and Africa, they are a potential source of vast petroleum supplies. In return for these benefits, it is incumbent on the British Government and the Government of India (which has political control of the coast from Bahrein to Salalah), to grant financial and economic assistance to the Arabs, who are virtually under British protection already, thereby enabling them to attain a standard of living comparable with that enjoyed by the peoples of territories which are officially under a mandate.

There is no doubt that if such a course were to be followed, amplified by assistance and expert advice in the agricultural and fishery industries, the Arabs would respond by giving us their trust and friendship, qualities which are unhappily deficient in Anglo-Arab relations at the present time. Arab agriculture in particular is in a woefully primitive state in the lower Persian Gulf, and the establishment of colleges, or advice centres, and expert assistance from India and the provision of modern implements, drainage and irrigation on up-to-date lines, would immeasurably help to increase the welfare of the native agriculturist.

795 peace, and obtaining reparation for maritime aggression committed in contravention of the agreement. Thus for a time order was restored in the Oman territories and the sheikhs were at liberty to wage war and undertake predatory raids, on condition that they did not permit any foreign power to intervene or acquire any interests, commercial or political, in the peninsula.

● 648 Towards the end of the first decade, however, another powerful influence began to make itself felt; the Ottoman Empire had already established its tentacles in Arabia, and in 1914, when British resources were strained to their utmost in various theatres of war, the Turks did their best to stir up strife in Oman. It was not until late in 1917 that Turkish forces withdrew from the Gulf, an event which coincided with Colonel Lawrence's victorious advance in north-west Arabia, culminating in the utter defeat of the Turkish army.

000 Although the name of Lawrence was legendary throughout Arabia at the end of the last war, it is remarkable that, in the south, at any rate, very few Arabs appear to have heard of him. Although I mentioned his name to scores of educated Arabs, the only ones who remembered his name and epic feats were the Khan Bahadur Abdur-bin-Razzak, the Sheikh of Sharjah, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Ali, ruler of the Beni Qitab. Even then there was no reverence or admiration in their recollection, but rather a tendency to regard his exploits as the amusing adventures of an eccentric foreigner. I believe this fact is mentioned by Douglas Glen in his book *In the Footsteps of Lawrence*, and it is a curious commentary on the Arab character.

648 During the 1939–45 war, especially when the British and
721 Dominion armies were fighting for their lives at El Alamein and Tobruk, the enemy made several attempts to foment strife in Oman and despatched spies, by way of Persia and Iraq, to incite turbulent elements amongst the tribes. Their efforts were always unsuccessful, thanks to the firm loyalty of the sheikhs, and the brilliant counter-espionage organization set up by the Khan Bahadur Abdur bin Razzak. His agents were scattered in towns and seaports throughout Oman and other parts of southern Arabia, and any stranger who landed on the coast was quickly trailed and his movements reported to headquarters at Sharjah. There was also an abortive movement to stir up a religious war, with the ultimate aim of freeing Arabia from the yoke of the foreigner, but this had very little success and was soon nipped in the bud. Italian or German airmen who flew over Arabia were nearly always forced

2: O'Shea G-3 (1944-1945) 1947 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

to land, and in not a single case were they taken prisoner; the sheikhs had declared war on Germany and they had their own traditional way of dealing with prisoners. 648

The Khan Bahadur rendered invaluable service to the British Empire during the many years that he held office as Residency Agent and, apart from his successful efforts to eradicate enemy influence in the peninsula and ensure the loyalty of the tribes, he has always been a beneficent influence and has won respect and admiration for the Crown. His retirement from office in 1945 was a great loss to British interests in Oman, and there are many amongst those who were familiar with his work and influence who consider that his selfless service to the British Government should have been recognized by the honour of knighthood. He is an extremely simple man, however, and honours and titles have little appeal for him; he has retired quietly to his estates in Quwait, to cultivate his beautiful gardens, perhaps to write a book of reminiscences, and to dream of the days when his will and personality alone kept the tribes in subjection. 648

I had the privilege of knowing the Khan Bahadur well, as I was a frequent guest at his house on Sharjah creek, and a great deal of my knowledge of the Arab mind and culture was derived from the long talks we had together. The descendant of a Saiyed, that is, one who claimed descent from Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, he was educated at a university in India and took a degree in law. Entering the Indian Civil Service, he held several important appointments under the Indian Government and was eventually posted to Oman as British Residency Agent, a post to which his tact and gifts of diplomacy were well suited. Although himself a rich man, Abdur bin Razzak was always conscious of the primitive condition of the Arab tribes of Oman; he invariably took the side of the poor man, and fought strenuously against the tyranny of the sheikhs and the attempts of the rich merchants to victimize the peasantry. 115 185

He had nothing but contempt for the meanness and extravagance of the sheikhs, and was often driven to vitriolic outbursts of scorn at their neglect of their subjects. In truth I think there was much of the idealist and reformer in his make-up, for he had Utopian visions of an Arabia in which the desert was scientifically irrigated, so that the valleys not only flourished with thriving date plantations, but were green with wheat fields and vegetable crops. 185 311

2: O'Shea G-3 (1944-1945) 1947 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

000 a note, but I have discussed the affairs of Oman with various Government officials, and there was nothing to indicate from their attitude that the Arabs have any justification for hoping that Great Britain will aid their social and economic regeneration. She will continue to adopt a benevolent attitude, will supply them with erudite pamphlets on democracy prepared by the British Council, and will ensure that they are protected from famine; apart from this, and much charitable advice from her suave Political Officers, she will allow the Trucial Coast Arabs to retain their primitive, feudal existence as long as it suits her to control the Gulf.

Lest it be thought that I am moved by political interests to attack the British regime in Arabia, I wish to emphasize that I have no interest in politics apart from the prescriptive rights of a member of the electorate. As a friend and admirer of the Arab race, however, I feel strongly that we have taken undue advantage of these people and have unethically avoided our responsibilities towards them. My protest is written in the hope that it may evoke a sense of shame, and encourage at least some members of the Government or public to insist that an official investigation should be made into conditions in this territory.

● 648 668 There is much discontent in the Arab world, and everywhere forces are at work, undermining British authority and attempting to foment rebellion against British rule. It would be pitiable if, after a hundred years of order and friendly relations with the Arabs of the Trucial Oman Coast, our lamentable policy of *laissez faire* and indifference should ultimately estrange this race and give rise to forces of reaction which might undo the admirable work of our pioneers and administrators.

Eastern base of a powerful air fleet, could command Arabia, Iraq, Persia and Africa; it could completely cut off the sea and air routes to India and South Africa, and could effectively close the Suez Canal. A belligerent foreign power which held Oman and the Persian Gulf could completely seal-off British influence south of the Mediterranean.

For this reason I think it is highly probable that the Air Ministry will retain Sharjah and the other R.A.F. bases in the Persian Gulf and use them not only as staging posts and re-fuelling points, but as permanent stations of Fighter or Bomber Command.

The political future of the Persian Gulf depends to a great extent on the British Government's policy. There is little doubt that the ruler of Saudi Arabia has no wish to extend his influence so far south. King Ibn Saud is content with his vast desert territories, many of which are rich in oil deposits which are being exploited to his advantage by international combines. It is said that his writ runs throughout the Arabian desert, but the Trucial sheikhs owe him no allegiance and, whilst according him great respect as a powerful leader, would resist any encroachment on their territory. British suzerainty, with all the financial tit-bits accruing to it, suits them admirably.

Russia has certain interests in southern Persia and the Gulf, and is anxious to develop the oil deposits in this region, but she is unlikely to extend her sphere of influence to Arabia; it is true that she would like to have a sea exit to the Persian Gulf, a valuable waterway with all India and the East as its goal, but her aims in the Middle East have never been published and it would be injudicious to hazard a guess about them.

A new importance was given to the Middle East by the discovery of oil. The word 'discovery' is perhaps not strictly accurate, since petroleum deposits were known to the Babylonians and the ancient inhabitants of Persia and Iraq. Natural gas was used for domestic purposes and perhaps worshipped by the Mithradites and Sumerians, whose principal god was the sun and fire. The Bible story of the 'burning bush' which Moses commanded, was probably based on an incident explainable to science, such as the ignition of an escape of petroleum gas. The priests of those days were skilled in utilizing phenomena of this sort for the performance of ritual magic, thus impressing the superstitious and ignorant masses.

2: O'Shea G-3 (1944-1945) 1947 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

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

The Khan Bahadur bin Razzak, British Residency Agent, Trucial Oman, standing in front of the magnificent Persian doorway of his house in Sharjah

following p 140 (b)

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CHAPTER XVI

IN February, 1945, the British Resident of the Gulf, Sir Geoffrey Prior, called a conference of the Trucial sheikhs at Baraimi. Baraimi was chosen as the site for the 'durbar' because it is in neutral territory and is practically the only part of Oman over which none of the sheikhs has suzerainty. It lies at the base of the Trucial political division, and is the meeting place of all the main caravan routes from Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sohar (on the Gulf of Oman side of the peninsula) and Ras-al-Khaimah. Roughly ninety miles south-east of Sharjah, Baraimi, which lies in the middle of a large oasis, is geographically the north-eastern extremity of the great Rub-al-Khali desert. It was from here that I began my journey into that desert later in the year.

For centuries Baraimi has been a centre of the slave trade; lying as it does between the western and eastern coasts of the peninsula, the terminus of the main Oman caravan routes, it is ideally situated for this purpose. In the heyday of the slave traffic, slaves were brought here by ship either from Abu Dhabi or Sohar. The former port was used more extensively towards the end of the nineteenth century, since the suppression of piracy by British gunboats forced the Arab dealers to lie low in the Persian Gulf until they could unload their cargoes.

To-day, there is no direct importation of negro slaves from the African coasts, but a secret traffic exists in the sale of young ex-slaves, negroes and Persians, who are abducted by raiding Bedouins from the villages and towns. These unfortunates are taken to Baraimi, over which territory the British Government has no treaty rights, and are sold in the open market. There is no fixed day for these sales, the dates often being changed or delayed for days and weeks, in order to delude any officials or Government agents who may be in the vicinity. The Political Officers and Indian Government officials with whom I discussed the matter categorically denied that there was a traffic in slaves, but I had evidence to the contrary and determined to find out for myself what truth there was in the stories I had heard.

2: O'Shea G-3 (1944-1945) 1947 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

567 The Khan Bahadur Abdur bin Razzak, who employed business and political agents throughout Oman, had assured me quite emphatically that his men had attended sales of slaves at Baraimi; unfortunately they had been unable to procure either the names of the dealers or the buyers, and in the eyes of the British law this did not constitute evidence. On the other hand, there was the case of the Persian merchant (related elsewhere in this book) who was abducted by Bedouins at Dubai and taken into captivity, where he remained as a slave until his escape in March, 1945. The facts of his incarceration were placed before the Political Officer, Captain Bird, and no doubt a full report of the case will be found in the archives of the Government of India.

I have interviewed a number of ex-slaves in Dubai and Sharjah, who confessed that they had been bought by their present masters from the slave market. As a rule, however, the buyers come from other parts of Arabia, generally from Qatar and the Bahrain side of the coast, as the dealers are anxious to get their human wares out of Oman as quickly as possible. Whilst awaiting their disposal and transportation from the Trucial Coast, these wretched creatures are kept in filthy dungeons in Baraimi, or else in the open desert where there is no likelihood of their being traced.

High prices are still paid for slaves and there is little doubt that the sheikhs connive at the trade, although they are only too ready to protest to the authorities if any of their subjects are abducted. The chief agents of the slave traffic are the Bedouin tribesmen, who are feared by the sheikhs, so that even if the latter wished to stop the trade they could only do so by uniting and waging a protracted war against the *Badu*.

●648 567 The difficulty facing the British (or Indian) Government in this matter is that Treaty rights extend to the coast of Trucial Oman only, and not to the interior, and Baraimi is neutral ground for which no one will claim responsibility. The site—it is scarcely a town—is largely inhabited by nomadic tribes of Bedouins, and is a noted refuge for the harbouring of criminals and desperate characters. Nothing less than an expedition and the establishment of a permanent police post would serve to abolish the slave market, and this could be done only if the British Government declared the Trucial Coast a Protectorate. It is extremely unlikely that such a step will be taken. Throughout the Middle East the Arab world is in a state of political ferment and, given the slightest provocation, the tribes might at any time unite and declare a 'Holy War' against

2: O'Shea G-3 (1944-1945) 1947 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

British and foreign influence in Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Arabia. 567 648

To seize a part of Arabia and declare it to be under the political protection of the British Empire would, according to my information, give the Arab League and its satellite organizations justifiable reasons for demanding full and unequivocable Arab independence in every country in the Middle East. As most political students of the Arab question are aware, the Jewish situation is a mere pawn in the political game, a bargaining point which the malcontents are using to obtain world sympathy and to give them a valid excuse for furthering their political aims. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that the Socialist Government will pursue the *laissez-faire* policy of its predecessors and leave the Trucial Oman Coast in its present state of impoverishment and degradation. And the slave trade will continue.

On behalf of British rule in the past, it must be said in all fairness that in the last century the Government played a principal part in the repression of the traffic, and nowhere more so than on the East African coast and in south-west Asia. In the old days it was vastly different. For example, on board the fleet which in 1626 conveyed Sir Dodmore Cotton, a British Ambassador with his staff from Surat to Bundar Abbas, there were more than three hundred slaves bought by Persians in India, and the only remark which this circumstance suggested to Sir Thomas Herbert, the chronicler of the embassy, was that 'ships, besides the transporting of riches and rarities from place to place, consociate the most remote regions of the earth by participation of commodities and of other excellencies to each other'. 567

In 1772, however, it was decided by the English courts that a slave, as soon as he set his foot on the soil of the British islands, became free; but the slave trade and the owning of slaves continued abroad under the British flag until a much later date. In 1790, out of some 74,000 slaves exported annually from Africa, not less than 38,000 belonged to British merchants. In 1811 an Act was passed declaring the traffic in slaves to be felony and was made punishable by transportation. In 1833 proprietory rights in slaves was abolished throughout the British dominions, but the final liberation of all slaves did not take place until August, 1838, the transition having been effected, in most places, by means of a period of indentured apprenticeship.

Slavery in the Persian Gulf has been regarded as a prerogative

3: Melamid S-3 (no date) 1954 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

rural and town populations there is a constant proportion of two to one. The average distance between "dorps" (villages with a population of some 2000) is 72 miles, and each dorp serves an average area of 2696 square miles. In contrast, a population center of about the same size in the canton of Zurich serves an average area of only 20 square miles. The wide-mesh distribution and great distances between central services are both costly and inconvenient and are only partly offset by the fact that every farm is able to supply its working population with essential foods such as corn and with tobacco. The present trend in the Karroo is a scientific attempt to adapt the economy more closely to the environment.—DONALD R. PETTERSON

ASIA

OIL AND THE EVOLUTION OF BOUNDARIES IN EASTERN ARABIA. Since my research for the paper on the "Political Geography of Trucial 'Oman and Qatar" (*Geogr. Rev.*, Vol. 43, 1953, pp. 194–206) was completed, hopes for the discovery of oil have led to further developments in the evolution of states and boundaries in eastern Arabia.

In Trucial 'Oman the maritime truces and treaties with Great Britain oblige the sheikhs (the so-called "Trucial sheikhs") to enforce the agreements (for example, suppression of slave trade) in their own territories. In the neutral areas of Trucial 'Oman no Trucial sheikh has any authority, yet Great Britain cannot enforce the treaties either, for they leave all affairs on land exclusively in the hands of the sheikhs. These shortcomings, particularly significant today in matters of oil concessions and development, have caused the abandonment of the concept of neutral areas in Trucial 'Oman. Such areas are now considered to be part of the territory of one or another of the Trucial sheikhs, who are thus able to exercise their authority. For similar reasons the Trucial sheikhdom of Kalba, the subject of many disputes, is no longer recognized; its former territory is now parceled among other Trucial sheikhdoms. The sheikhdom of Fujaira, which effectively occupies an area near the Gulf of 'Oman, has now been elevated to Trucial rank, with all rights and obligations. As the result of these developments, political conditions in Trucial 'Oman are much more stable today than ever before. This fact in itself, independent of the discovery of oil, may account for recent economic growth. The accompanying table summarizes some of the recent changes in the seven Trucial sheikhdoms of 'Oman. Additional information, particularly for the guidance of travelers, is available in the "Handbook on the Persian Gulf" published by the British Foreign Office (1953). No demarcation of boundaries between Trucial sheikhdoms has yet been reported, and since the basic political relations between the sheikhs remain the same, war may flare up at any time though in view of the recent economic changes this is believed to be less likely than before.

With the abandonment of the concept of neutral areas in Trucial 'Oman, six villages of the oasis—or, rather, group of oases—called Buraimi (Muwaiqih, Mataradh, Al Ain, Jimi, Qattara, and Hilli), inhabited by the Abu Falah tribe, are now considered to be, and are administered as, a part of Abu Dhabi. The village of Buraimi, inhabited by the Naim tribe, which is reported to graze its herds to the east of the oasis, is part of the Sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman, and thus outside Trucial 'Oman. The remaining village of the oasis, Hamasa, inhabited by the Bu Sham tribe (also reported to graze its herds southeast of the oasis), is occupied by Saudi Arabia (see Melamid, *op. cit.*, p. 204, footnote 23) and claimed

[see p. 296--Analyst]

3: Melamid S-3 (no date) 1954 MK4 Trucial Oman MK4

TABLE I—SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN TRUCIAL SHEIKHDOMS

TRUCIAL SHEIKHDOM	RECENT CHANGES
ABU DHABI	The largest Trucial sheikhdom, territorially better consolidated than before. Prospecting for oil proceeds on land; oil, of a better quality than the other Arabian oils, has been discovered at Murban (about 23° 50′ N. and 53° 45′ E.), but the full significance of the discovery has not yet been evaluated. A new oil concession, to last 65 years, for the offshore subsurface rights in the Persian Gulf, as defined in the 1951 arbitration award, was granted to a combination of British (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) and French companies in March, 1953; the area is described as exceeding 12,000 square miles (no information has been released to show how this figure was calculated); under the terms of the concession, exploration must begin within a year, and drilling within five years.
DUBAI	The town of Dibai is expanding rapidly; its population is now estimated at 38,000. Two commercial banks and a hospital have been established, and there are regular bimonthly mail-steamer connections with Iraq and India. In view of the growth of Dibai, the headquarters of the British Political Agent for Trucial 'Oman are being transferred there from Sharjah. An offshore concession described as covering 1300 square miles was granted in August, 1952, to the same group of companies that have obtained the Abu Dhabi offshore concession; the terms also are the same, except that the duration is limited to 60 years. Drilling to 12,000 feet has produced no oil so far.
SHARJAH	Probably now the second largest of the Trucial sheikhdoms; includes the inland oasis of Dhaid and the town of Kalba, on the Gulf of 'Oman. The aerodrome near the town of Sharjah is served by three flights a week from Bahrein, the only regular air service to Trucial 'Oman.
AJMAN	No change.
UMM AL QAIWAIN	" "
RAS AL KHAIMA	" "
FUJAIRA	Trucial sheikhdom since 1952; economically unimportant.

by the Sultan of Muscat and 'Oman. After some skirmishes between the troops of Saudi Arabia and British-officered Trucial 'Oman levies, a standstill agreement, similar to the Palestine armistice agreements, was reached, which stabilized for the time being the positions occupied by the various states and armies. Owing to the location of Hamasa between the other villages of the oasis, this standstill agreement has resulted in some form of blockade of the forces of Saudi Arabia there; Saudi Arabian efforts to supply Hamasa have led to further bloodshed and complaints to the United Nations. Since the oasis of Buraimi contains the only sizable wells in the eastern Rub' al Khali desert, possession of, and free access to, all or parts of it is important to anyone who desires to rule, and exploit the minerals of, the Empty Quarter of Arabia. Several suggestions for amicable settlement or arbitration of the dispute have been made, particularly by the new King of Saudi Arabia (*New York Times*, Nov. 11, 1953). In view of the importance of the oasis, definite boundaries between Saudi Arabia, Trucial 'Oman, the Sultanate of Muscat and 'Oman (in whose Dhofar region a group of American oil companies has a concession), and possibly Aden Protectorate may now be established, though the process of definition would take some time. All the oil companies operating in the states concerned have announced their agreement to any new boundaries that may be drawn.—ALEXANDER MELAMID

PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

ARID ZONE RESEARCH. "Reviews of Research on Arid Zone Hydrology" (Paris, 1953) is the first fruit of UNESCO's Arid Zone Programme, which had its beginning in 1948. For study purposes the arid lands of the world were divided into eight regions—

TO 133 502 721 in two miles from their entrances. Thus it was that the pirate tribes were able to build their towns behind these natural booms, and to carry on their ruthless calling in defiance of the British and Portuguese navies — and to earn for their stronghold the much feared and romantic name, "The Pirate Coast".

TO 101 631 648 628 [527] Trucial 'Oman, as it is called today, is ruled by six independent sheikhs, bound under old treaties with Britain to maintain a maritime truce for the prevention of piracy and slave-trading. Family feuds and inter-tribal quarrelling are as common among them as are the rusty, ancient cannon. Many of the latter are no doubt from British men-o'-war, and some are still used for ceremonial occasions, a party afterwards being despatched to retrieve the cannon-balls.

TO 361 504 439 Unspoiled by time, Sharjah is one of the principal little towns, but it lacks the enchantment of Dibai, a picturesque centre a few miles along the coast to the west. A wide, shallow inlet divides Dibái and its waterfront of quaint little coffee-houses, and provides anchorage for dhows that bring transshipped goods from other continents. In the large market-place, spread on either side of the inlet and connected by a ferry-service of numerous little pole-propelled craft, the bedouin, with his henna-dyed beard and ancient rifle, can be seen fingering everything that is on show, from modern radio sets to ladies' lingerie, but he has little use for some of the strange products of the West.

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p. 191 (A)

3:Royal Institute of International Affairs U-4 (no date)1954 M1 Middle East
Trucial Oman MK4
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THE TRUCIAL COAST

The shore extending eastward from Qatar to the entrance to the Gulf consists of the shaikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dibay, Sharja, Kalba, Ras al-Khaima, Umm al-Quwain, and Ajman. Most possess shallow anchorages on an inlet; inland, they have few interests apart from access to wells, and their frontiers with Saudi Arabia are undemarcated.

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The interest they present from an international point of view lies largely in the success or failure in prospecting for oil. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd, which is, like its companion in Qatar, an affiliate of IPC has drilled test wells in both Abu Dhabi and Dibay, so far without success. The Shaikhdom of Abu Dhabi has, however, come into prominence on two other counts. First, its dealings with the company were in 1951 the subject of the noted arbitration case in which the Shaikh claimed the right to grant a concession to the Superior Oil Company under the sea-bed off his coasts. PDL lost their claim that their concession extended beyond his territorial waters. Exploration rights in marine areas have been granted to Anglo-Iranian off Abu Dhabi and to Anglo-Iranian in association with the Compagnie Française des Pétroles off Dibay.

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In 1952–3, pressure was exercised on the Shaikh from another quarter, Saudi Arabia. The oasis of Buraimi, which consists of eight villages and lies on the undelimited confines of Abu Dhabi and the Sultanate of Muscat, was partly occupied by a servant of the Saudi Arabian Government on grounds, contested by both the lesser rulers concerned, that the family had owned it in the nineteenth century and claimed title to its ancestral domain. It is likely that belief in the oil-bearing possibilities of these deserts precipitated this sudden claim. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat both sought and obtained some British diplomatic help in upholding their title to the oasis. The incident was important chiefly because it showed how unwise it is not to delimit such frontiers before they assume economic importance through the discovery of mineral wealth.

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MUSCAT AND OMAN

The area of this independent Sultanate[1] is estimated at about 82,000 square miles. It lies at the extreme south-east of the Arabian peninsula, and has a sea coast of some 1,000 miles facing south-east and east and extending from the frontier of the Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra (Eastern Aden Protectorate)

[1] Its status was affirmed by the Hague Court in the Muscat Dhows Case in 1905.

14: Liebeny G-4 (no date)1947 MI Middle East
Kuwait MI1
Trucial Oman MK4

November 3, 1914, promised their support to the Sheikh if he attacked certain neighboring districts then under Turkish control; further, they guaranteed the possession of some real estate owned by him personally and recognized Kuwait as "an independent government under British protection." K 648 471

Oil rights in Kuwait, as in Bahrein, were originally acquired by a British negotiator, Major Holmes, who then attempted to transfer the concession to the Gulf Oil Company. Again difficulties developed because of the opposition of the British Government. The situation was further complicated in this case by the sudden interest shown by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in which the British Government owns a majority of stock. The U. S. Department of State again intervened in favor of equal treatment for the American company. In this case a compromise was reached between British and American interests, and the Kuwait Oil Company, owned in equal parts by the Gulf Oil Company and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, was established for the exploitation of the Kuwait concession.

Trucial Oman. From the base of the Qatar Peninsula to the Gulf of Oman, with the exception of the tip of the Musandam Peninsula which is part of Muscat, the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf is ruled by several independent sheikhs who have entered into treaty relations with the British dating back to 1820, when a treaty of peace was concluded between them and the East India Company. The treaty was followed by various agreements dealing primarily with the suppression of piracy and slave trade, as was the case with Bahrein. A general perpetual peace treaty providing also for peace between the various sheikhs was concluded in 1853. In March 1892 the sheikhs signed a so-called exclusive agreement, its text being identical with that of the Bahrein agreement of March 13 of the same year. The Trucial sheikhs were thus brought into a relationship with Great Britain which is comparable to that of Bahrein and Kuwait. The British representative in the area is the Political Officer, Trucial Coast. T 648

Here, too, assurances were given by the local rulers that pearling and oil concessions would be given only with British approval. An oil concession is held by Petroleum Concessions, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company. T 471

30: Gt. Britain G-5 (ca. 1918) 1920 MJ1 Saudi Arabia
Trucial Oman MK4

439 and Dibai for their connivance in this traffic; in 1910 resistance was offered at Dibai to an armed party from H.M.S. *Hyacinth*, an encounter resulting in loss of life on both sides. Such illegal traffic satisfied the adventurous spirit of a maritime people, whose indulgence in buccaneering before the policing of the Gulf earned for their W. littoral the name of the Pirate Coast. But the establishment of the Arms Warehouse at Muscat (see Chap VIII, p. 247) has cut off the principal source of supply.

433 Local manufactures are few, and their products not sufficiently extensive to be exported. Fine sheep-wool abbas are made at Shārjah and daggers at Ras el-Kheimah. The latter are of the curved form universal along the Gulf from Koweit to the S., as also in parts of Western India.

Recent History and Present Politics

631 The position of the five ruling Sheikhs is regulated by two agree-
• 648 ments with the British Government. The first, signed in 1853, provides for the cessation of hostilities at sea between the signatories, and imposes on Great Britain the duty of enforcing peace and obtaining reparation for breaches of it. The second, signed in 1892, binds the Sheikhs not to enter into correspondence or agreement with any power other than the British Government, not to permit the agent of any other Government to reside within their territories, and not to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise alienate to any other Government any part of their respective territories. The apparent effect of the two agreements is to place the foreign relations of the Sheikhs under British control, and to make Great Britain responsible for their protection should they be endangered through carrying out their obligations. In 1913 there was a certain apprehension, especially at Abu Dhabi, that the victorious Emir of Nejd might extend his conquests on the side of Oman. The number of Trucial chiefs recognized by Great Britain may at any time be increased. The Sheikhs of Ras el-Kheimah, Hamrīyah, and Fujeirah are already practically independent. The sheikhdoms are very unequal in importance, ranging from considerable territories like those of Shārjah and Abu Dhabi to small districts consisting of little more than a single township and its environs. In the following sections the Principalities, or Sheikhdoms, are described in order from east to west.

TRUCIAL OMAN MK4

named for its main town—Sharja, Ras al Khaima, Umm al Quwain, 'Ajman, Dibai (Dubai) and Abu Dhabi, on the Persian Gulf, and Kalba on the Gulf of Oman. The ruling sheikhs have had protective treaty agreements with Great Britain since 1853. At that time, a truce was declared between the British government and the different principalities which put an end to piracy in these waters and earned them the designation of the "Trucial States."

The east coast is mountainous, with hills rising abruptly from the Gulf of Oman, but most of the Persian Gulf littoral is low and sandy. The coast is bordered by salt creeks and lagoons, many of which unite inland to form mangrove swamps, while numerous reefs and islands stud the shallow waters

p. 311(a)

Trucial Oman MK4
Qatar MK3
Kuwait MI1

K 648 of the Central Powers. In return for this loyalty, the British in a note of 3 November 1914 promised their support to the Sheikh if he attacked certain neighboring districts then under Turkish control; further, it guaranteed the possession of some real estate owned by him personally and recognized Kuwait as "an independent government under British protection."

T 648 c. Trucial Oman. From Khor Kalbah to Khor al-'Udayd, the western shore of the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, with the exception of the tip of the Musandam peninsula which is part of Musoat, is ruled by several independent sheikhs. These rulers have entered into treaty relations with the British Government. These relations date back to 1820, when a treaty of peace was concluded between these sheikhs and the East India Company. It was followed by various agreements dealing primarily with the suppression of piracy and slave trade. (22) A general perpetual peace treaty providing also for

22. The treaties concerning the Trucial Oman are collected in Aitchison, pp. 239-57. The Trucial Sheikhs include the Sheikhs of Shargah, Ras-al-Khaima, Debai, Abu Dhabi, Umm-al-Qaiwain, Ajman and, since 1936, also the Sheikh of Kalba.

peace between the various Sheikhs was concluded in 1853. In March 1853 the sheikhs signed a so-called exclusive agreement. Its text is identical with that of the Bahrein agreement of March of the same year. The Trucial Sheikhs were thus brought into a relationship with Great Britain which is parallel to that of Bahrein and Kuwait. The British representative in the area is the Political Officer, Trucial Coast, who is assisted by the British Residency Agent on the Trucial Coast.

T 648 471 Here, too, assurances were given by the local rulers that pearling and oil concessions would be given only with British approval. An oil concession is held by Petroleum Concessions, a subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Q 648 d. Qater. An agreement with the Sheikh of Qatar was concluded by the British on 3 November 1916. (23) In it the Sheikh